the ethics(part iv)-第1章

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The　Ethics　＇Part　4＇







（Ethica　Ordine　Geometrico　Demonstrata）







by　Benedict　de　Spinoza







Translated　by　R。　H。　M。　Elwes





















PART　IV：　　Of　Human　Bondage；　or　the　Strength　of　the　Emotions



















PREFACE







Human　infirmity　in　moderating　and　checking　the　emotions　I　name　bondage：　



for；　when　a　man　is　a　prey　to　his　emotions；　he　is　not　his　own　master；　but　



lies　at　the　mercy　of　fortune：　so　much　so；　that　he　is　often　compelled；　



while　seeing　that　which　is　better　for　him；　to　follow　that　which　is　worse。　



Why　this　is　so；　and　what　is　good　or　evil　in　the　emotions；　I　propose　to　



show　in　this　part　of　my　treatise。　But；　before　I　begin；　it　would　be　well　



to　make　a　few　prefatory　observations　on　perfection　and　imperfection；　



good　and　evil。　







When　a　man　has　purposed　to　make　a　given　thing；　and　has　brought　it　



to　perfection；　his　work　will　be　pronounced　perfect；　not　only　by　



himself；　but　by　everyone　who　rightly　knows；　or　thinks　that　he　knows；　



the　intention　and　aim　of　its　author。　For　instance；　suppose　anyone　sees　a　



work　（which　I　assume　to　be　not　yet　completed）；　and　knows　that　the　aim　



of　the　author　of　that　work　is　to　build　a　house；　he　will　call　the　work　



imperfect；　he　will；　on　the　other　hand；　call　it　perfect；　as　soon　as　he　



sees　that　it　is　carried　through　to　the　end；　which　its　author　had　purposed　



for　it。　But　if　a　man　sees　a　work；　the　like　whereof　he　has　never　seen　



before；　and　if　he　knows　not　the　intention　of　the　artificer；　he　plainly　



cannot　know；　whether　that　work　be　perfect　or　imperfect。　Such　seems　to　



be　the　primary　meaning　of　these　terms。







But；　after　men　began　to　form　general　ideas；　to　think　out　types　of　



houses；　buildings；　towers；　&c。；　and　to　prefer　certain　types　to　others；　



it　came　about；　that　each　man　called　perfect　that　which　he　saw　agree　



with　the　general　idea　he　had　formed　of　the　thing　in　question；　and　called　



imperfect　that　which　he　saw　agree　less　with　his　own　preconceived　type；　



even　though　it　had　evidently　been　completed　in　accordance　with　the　idea　



of　its　artificer。　　This　seems　to　be　the　only　reason　for　calling　natural　



phenomena；　which；　indeed；　are　not　made　with　human　hands；　perfect　or　



imperfect：　for　men　are　wont　to　form　general　ideas　of　things　natural；　no　



less　than　of　things　artificial；　and　such　ideas　they　hold　as　types；　



believing　that　Nature　（who　they　think　does　nothing　without　an　object）　



has　them　in　view；　and　has　set　them　as　types　before　herself。　Therefore；　



when　they　behold　something　in　Nature；　which　does　not　wholly　conform　to　



the　preconceived　type　which　they　have　formed　of　the　thing　in　question；　



they　say　that　Nature　has　fallen　short　or　has　blundered；　and　has　left　



her　work　incomplete。　Thus　we　see　that　men　are　wont　to　style　natural　



phenomena　perfect　or　imperfect　rather　from　their　own　prejudices；　than　



from　true　knowledge　of　what　they　pronounce　upon。







Now　we　showed　in　the　Appendix　to　Part　I。；　that　Nature　does　not　work　



with　an　end　in　view。　For　the　eternal　and　infinite　Being；　which　we　call　



God　or　Nature；　acts　by　the　same　necessity　as　that　whereby　it　exists。　For　



we　have　shown；　that　by　the　same　necessity　of　its　nature；　whereby　it　



exists；　it　likewise　works　（I：xvi。）。　The　reason　or　cause　why　God　or　Nature　



exists；　and　the　reason　why　he　acts；　are　one　and　the　same。　　Therefore；　



as　he　does　not　exist　for　the　sake　of　an　end；　so　neither　does　he　act　for　



the　sake　of　an　end；　of　his　existence　and　of　his　action　there　is　neither　



origin　nor　end。　Wherefore；　a　cause　which　is　called　final　is　nothing　else　



but　human　desire；　in　so　far　as　it　is　considered　as　the　origin　or　cause　



of　anything。　For　example；　when　we　say　that　to　be　inhabited　is　the　final　



cause　of　this　or　that　house；　we　mean　nothing　more　than　that　a　man；　



conceiving　the　conveniences　of　household　life；　had　a　desire　to　build　a　



house。　Wherefore；　the　being　inhabited；　in　so　far　as　it　is　regarded　as　



a　final　cause；　is　nothing　else　but　this　particular　desire；　which　is　



really　the　efficient　cause；　it　is　regarded　as　the　primary　cause；　



because　men　are　generally　ignorant　of　the　causes　of　their　desires。　



They　are；　as　I　have　often　said　already；　conscious　of　their　own　actions　



and　appetites；　but　ignorant　of　the　causes　whereby　they　are　determined　



to　any　particular　desire。　Therefore；　the　common　saying　that　Nature　



sometimes　falls　short；　or　blunders；　and　produces　things　which　are　



imperfect；　I　set　down　among　the　glosses　treated　of　in　the　Appendix　to　



Part　1。　　Perfection　and　imperfection；　then；　are　in　reality　merely　modes　



of　thinking；　or　notions　which　we　form　from　a　comparison　among　one　



another　of　individuals　of　the　same　species；　hence　I　said　above　



（II：Def。vi。）；　that　by　reality　and　perfection　I　mean　the　same　thing。　



For　we　are　wont　to　refer　all　the　individual　things　in　nature　to　one　



genus；　which　is　called　the　highest　genus；　namely；　to　the　category　of　



Being；　whereto　absolutely　all　individuals　in　nature　belong。　Thus；　in　



so　far　as　we　refer　the　individuals　in　nature　to　this　category；　and　



comparing　them　one　with　another；　find　that　some　possess　more　of　being　or　



reality　than　others；　we；　to　this　extent；　say　that　some　are　more　perfect　



than　others。　Again；　in　so　far　as　we　attribute　to　them　anything　implying　



negation　…　as　term；　end；　infirmity；　etc。；　we；　to　this　extent；　call　them　



imperfect；　because　they　do　not　affect　our　mind　so　much　as　the　things　



which　we　call　perfect；　not　because　they　have　any　intrinsic　deficiency；　



or　because　Nature　has　blundered。　For　nothing　lies　within　the　scope　of　a　



thing's　nature；　save　that　which　follows　from　the　necessity　of　the　nature　



of　its　efficient　cause；　and　whatsoever　follows　from　the　necessity　of　the　



nature　of　its　efficient　cause　necessarily　comes　to　pass。







As　for　the　terms　good　and　bad；　they　indicate　no　positive　quality　in　



things　regarded　in　themselves；　but　are　merely　modes　of　thinking；　or　



notions　which　we　form　from　the　comparison　of　things　one　with　another。　



Thus　one　and　the　same　thing　can　be　at　the　same　time　good；　bad；　and　



indifferent。　For　instance；　music　is　good　for　him　that　is　melancholy；　



bad　for　him　that　mourns；　for　him　that　is　deaf；　it　is　neither　good　nor　



bad。







Nevertheless；　though　this　be　so；　the　terms　should　still　be　retained。　



For；　inasmuch　as　we　desire　to　form　an　idea　of　man　as　a　type　of　human　



nature　which　we　may　hold　in　view；　it　will　be　useful　for　us　to　retain　



the　terms　in　question；　in　the　sense　I　have　indicated。







In　what　follows；　then；　I　shall　mean　by；　〃good〃　that；　which　we　



certainly　know　to　be　a　means　of　approaching　more　nearly　to　the　type　



of　human　nature；　which　we　have　set　before　ourselves；　by　〃bad；〃　that　



which　we　certainly　know　to　be　a　hindrance　to　us　in　approaching　the　



said　type。　　Again；　we　shall　that　men　are　more　perfect；　or　more　imperfect；　



in　proportion　as　they　approach　more　or　less　nearly　to　the　said　type。　



For　it　must　be　specially　remarked　that；　when　I　say　that　a　man　passes　



from　a　lesser　to　a　greater　perfection；　or　vice　versa；　I　do　not　mean　



that　he　is　changed　from　one　essence　or　reality　to　another；　for　instance；　



a　horse　would　be　as　completely　destroyed　by　being　changed　into　a　man；　



as　by　being　changed　into　an　insect。　What　I　mean　is；　that　we　conceive　the　



thing's　power　of　action；　in　so　far　as　this　is　understood　by　its　nature；　



to　be　increased　or　diminished。　Lastly；　by　perfection　in　general　I　shall；　



as　I　have　said；　mean　reality　in　other　words；　each　thing's　essence；　in　so　



far　as　it　exists；　and　operates　in　a　particular　manner；　and　without　paying　



any　regard　to　its　duration。　For　no　given　thing　can　be　said　to　be　more　



perfect；　because　it　has　passed　a　longer　time　in　existence。　The　duration　



of　things　cannot　be　determined　by　their　essence；　for　the　essence　of　



things　involves　no　fixed　and　definite　period　of　existence；　but　everything；　



whether　it　be　more　perfect　or　less　perfect；　will　always　be　able　to　persist　



in　existence　with　the　same　force　wherewith　it　began　to　exist；　wherefore；　in　



this　respect；　all　things　are　equal。















DEFINITIONS。







I。　By　good　I　mean　that　which　we　certainly　know　to　be　useful　to　us。







II。　By　evil　I　mean　that　which　we　certainly　know　to　be　a　hindrance　



to　us　in　the　attainment　of　any　good。　（Concerning　these　terms　see　the　



foregoing　preface　towards　the　end。）







III。　Particular　things　I　call　contingent　in　so　far　as；　while　regarding　



their　essence　only；　we　find　nothing　therein；　which　necessarily　asserts　



their　existence　or　excludes　it。







IV。　Particular　things　I　call　possible　in　so　far　as；　while　regarding　the　



causes　whereby　they　must　be　produced；　we　know　not；　whether　such　causes　



be　determined　for　producing　them。







（In　I：xxxiii。note。i。；　I　drew　no　distinction　between　possible　and　



contingent；　because　there　was　in　that　place　no　need　to　distinguish　



them　accurately。）







V。　By　conflicting　emotions　I　mean　those　which　draw　a　man　in　different　



directions；　though　they　are　of　the　same　kind；　such　as　luxury　and　



avarice；　which　are　both　species　of　love；　and　are　contraries；　not　



by　nature；　but　by　accident。







VI。　What　I　mean　by　emotion　felt　towards　a　thing；　future；　present；　and　



past；　I　explained　in　III：xviii。；notes。i。；&ii。；　which　see。







（But　I　should　here　also　remark；　that　we　can　only　distinctly　conceive　



distance　of　space　or　time　up　to　a　certain　definite　limit；　that　is；　all　



objects　distant　from　us　more　than　two　hundred　feet；　or　whose　distance　



from　the　place　where　we　are　exceeds　that　which　we　can　distinctly　conceive；　



seem　to　be　an　equal　distance　from　us；　and　all　in　the　same　plane；　so　also　



objects；　whose　time　of　existing　is　conceived　as　removed　from　the　present　



by　a　longer　interval　than　we　can　distinctly　conceive；　seem　to　be　all　



equally　distant　from　the　present；　and　are　set　down；　as　it　were；　to　the　



same　moment　of　time。）







VII。　By　an　end；　for　the　sake　of　which　we　do　something；　I　mean　a　desire。







VIII。　By　virtue　（virtus）　and　power　I　mean　the　same　thing；　that　is　



（III：vii。）；　virtue；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　man；　is　a　man's　



nature　or　essence；　in　so　far　as　it　has　the　power　of　effecting　what　



can　only　be　understood　by　the　laws　of　that　nature。















AXIOM。







There　is　no　individual　thing　in　nature；　than　which　there　is　not　



another　more　powerful　and　strong。　Whatsoever　thing　be　given；　there　is　



something　stronger　whereby　it　can　be　destroyed。















PROPOSITIONS。



Prop。　I。　No　positive　quality　possessed　by　a　



false　idea　is　removed　by　the　presence　of　



what　is　true；　in　virtue　of　its　being　true。







Proof。…　Falsity　consists　solely　in　the　privation　of　knowledge　which　



inadequate　ideas　involve　（II：xxxv。）