parmenides-第6章
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How can they be？
But if they are not other； either by reason of themselves or of
the other； will they not altogether escape being other than one
another？
They will。
Again； the not…one cannot partake of the one； otherwise it would not
have been not…one； but would have been in some way one。
True。
Nor can the not…one be number； for having number； it would not
have been not…one at all。
It would not。
Again； is the not…one part of the one； or rather； would it not in
that case partake of the one？
It would。
If then； in every point of view； the one and the not…one are
distinct； then neither is the one part or whole of the not…one； nor is
the not…one part or whole of the one？
No。
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one
another； nor other than one another； will be the same with one
another： …so we said？
Yes。
Then shall we say that the one； being in this relation to the
not…one； is the same with it？
Let us say so。
Then it is the same with itself and the others； and also other
than itself and the others。
That appears to be the inference。 And it will also be like and
unlike itself and the others？
Perhaps。
Since the one was shown to be other than the others； the others will
also be other than the one。
Yes。
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the
others are other than it； and neither more nor less？
True。
And if neither more nor less； then in a like degree？
Yes。
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and
others in like manner other than it； the one will be affected like the
others and the others like the one。
How do you mean？
I may take as an illustration the case of names： You give a name
to a thing？
Yes。
And you may say the name once or oftener？
Yes。
And when you say it once； you mention that of which it is the
name？ and when more than once； is it something else which you mention？
or must it always be the same thing of which you speak； whether you
utter the name once or more than once？
Of course it is the same。
And is not 〃other〃 a name given to a thing？
Certainly。
Whenever； then； you use the word 〃other；〃 whether once or oftener；
you name that of which it is the name； and to no other do you give the
name？
True。
Then when we say that the others are other than the one； and the one
other than the others； in repeating the word 〃other〃 we speak of
that nature to which the name is applied； and of no other？
Quite true。
Then the one which is other than others； and the other which is
other than the one； in that the word 〃other〃 is applied to both；
will be in the same condition； and that which is in the same condition
is like？
Yes。
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the
others； every thing will be like every thing； for every thing is other
than every thing。
True。
Again； the like is opposed to the unlike？
Yes。
And the other to the same？
True again。
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others？
Yes。
And to be； the same with the others is the opposite of being other
than the others？
Certainly。
And in that it was other it was shown to be like？
Yes。
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the
opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of
otherness。
Yes。
The same then will make it unlike； otherwise it will not be the
opposite of the other。
True。
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others； like in so far
as it is other； and unlike in so far as it is the same。
Yes； that argument may be used。
And there is another argument。
What？
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected
otherwise； and not being affected otherwise is not unlike； and not
being unlike； is like； but in so far as it is affected by other it
is otherwise； and being otherwise affected is unlike。
True。
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than
the others； on either of these two grounds； or on both of them； it
will be both like and unlike the others？
Certainly。
And in the same way as being other than itself； and the same with
itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them； it will
be like and unlike itself。
Of course。
Again； how far can the one touch or not touch itself and
others？…Consider。
I am considering。
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole？
True。
And also in other things？
Yes。
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things；
but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching
them； and would touch itself only。
Clearly。
Then the inference is that it would touch both？
It would。
But what do you say to a new point of view？ Must not that which is
to touch another be next to that which it is to touch； and occupy
the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated？
True。
Then the one； if it is to touch itself； ought to be situated next to
itself； and occupy the place next to that in which itself is？
It ought。
And that would require that the one should be two； and be in two
places at once； and this； while it is one； will never happen。
No。
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two？
It cannot。
Neither can it touch others。
Why not？
The reason is； that whatever is to touch another must be in
separation from； and next to； that which it is to touch； and no
third thing can be between them。
True。
Two things； then； at the least ate necessary to make contact
possible？
They are。
And if to the two a third be added in due order； the number of terms
will be three； and the contacts two？
Yes。
And every additional term makes one additional contact； whence it
follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms； the
first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one； and the
whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in
like manner； and for every one which is afterwards added to the number
of terms； one contact is added to the contacts。
True。
Whatever is the whole number of things； the contacts will be
always one less。
True。
But if there be only one； and not two； there will be no contact？
How can there be？
And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not
one and have no part in the one？
True。
Then they have no number； if they have no one in them？
Of course not。
Then the others are neither one nor two； nor are they called by
the name of any number？
No。
One； then； alone is one； and two do not exist？
Clearly not。
And if there are not two； there is no contact？
There is not。
Then neither does the one touch the others； nor the others the
one； if there is no contact？
Certainly not。
For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself
and the others？
True。
Further…is the one equal and unequal to itself and others？
How do you mean？
If the one were greater or less than the others； or the others
greater or less than the one； they would not be greater or less than
each other in virtue of their being the one and the others； but； if in
addition to their being what they are they had equality； they would be
equal to one another； or if the one had smallness and the others
greatness； or the one had greatness and the others smallness…whichever
kind had greatness would be greater； and whichever had smallness would
be smaller？
Certainly。
Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness； for if
they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present
in that which is。
How could they？
If； then； smallness is present in the one it will be present
either in the whole or in a part of the whole？
Certainly。
Suppose the first； it will be either co…equal and co…extensive
with the whole one； or will contain the one？
Clearly。
If it be co…extensive with the one it will be coequal with the
one； or if containing the one it will be greater than the one？
Of course。
But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything； and
have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own
functions？
Impossible。
Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one； but； if at all； in a
part only？
Yes。
And surely not in all of a part； for then the difficulty of the
whole will recur； it will be equal to or greater than any part in
which it is。
Certainly。
Then smallness will not be in anything； whether in a whole or in a
part； nor will there be anything small but actual smallness。
True。
Neither will greatness be in the one； for if greatness be in
anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness
itself； namely； that in which greatness is； and this too when the
small itself is not there； which the one； if it is great； must exceed；
this； however； is impossible； seeing that smallness is wholly absent。
True。
But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness；
and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness。
Very true。
Then other things not greater or less than the one； if they have
neither greatness nor smallness； nor have greatness or smallness any
power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one； but
only in relation to one another； nor will the one be greater or less
than them or others； if it has neither greatness nor smallness。
Clearly not。
Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others； it
cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them？
Certainly not。
And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded； must be on an
equality； and being on an equality； must be equal。
Of course。
And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself；
having neither greatness nor smallness in itself； it will neither
exceed nor be exceeded by itself； but will be on an equality with
and equal to itself。
Certainly。
Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others？
Clearly so。
And yet the one； being itself in itself； will also surround and be
without itself； and； as containing itself； will be greater than
itself； and； as contained in itself； will be less； and will thus be
gr
