parmenides-第8章
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Certainly。
Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to
that which previously had become and was older； it never really is
older； but is always becoming； for the one is always growing on the
side of youth and the other on the side of age。 And in like manner the
older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger； for
as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways
the opposite to one another； the younger older than the older and
the older younger than the younger。 They cannot； however have
become； for if they had already become they would be and not merely
become。 But that is impossible； for they are always becoming both
older and younger than one another： the one becomes younger than the
others because it was seen to be older and prior； and the others
become older than the one because they came into being later； and in
the same way the others are in the same relation to the one； because
they were seen to be older； and prior to the one。
That is clear。
Inasmuch then； one thing does not become older or younger than
another； in that they always differ from each other by an equal
number； the one cannot become older or younger than the others； nor
the other than the one； but inasmuch as that which came into being
earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ
from each other by a different portion…in this point of view the
others must become older and younger than the one； and the one than
the others。
Certainly。
For all these reasons； then； the one is and becomes older and
younger than itself and the others； and neither is nor becomes older
or younger than itself or the others。
Certainly。
But since the one partakes of time； and partakes of becoming older
and younger； must it not also partake of the past； the present； and
the future？
Of course it must。
Then the one was and is and will be； and was becoming and is
becoming and will become？
Certainly。
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to
it and belongs to it？
True。
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and
perception of the one； there is opinion and knowledge and perception
of it？
Quite right。
Then there is name and expression for it； and it is named and
expressed； and everything of this kind which appertains to other：
things appertains to the one。
Certainly； that is true。
Yet once more and for the third time； let us consider： If the one is
both one and many； as we have described； and is； neither one nor many；
and participates in time； must it not； in as far as it is one； at
times partake of being； and in as far as it is not one； at times not
partake of being？
Certainly。
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being； or not
partake of being when partaking of being？
Impossible。
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different
times； for that is the only way in which it can partake and not
partake of the same。
True。
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and
relinquishes being…for how can it have and not have the same thing
unless it receives and also gives it up at； some time？
Impossible。
And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming？
I should。
And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction？
I should。
The one then； as would appear； becomes and is destroyed by taking
and giving up being。
Certainly。
And being one and many and in process of becoming and being
destroyed； when it becomes one it ceases to be many； and when many； it
ceases to be one？
Certainly。
And as it becomes one and many； must it not inevitably experience
separation and aggregation？
Inevitably。
And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and
dissimilated？
Yes。
And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or
diminish or be equalized？
True。
And when being in motion it rests； and when being at rest it changes
to motion； it can surely be in no time at all？
How can it？
But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in
motion； or previously in motion and afterwards at rest； without
experiencing change； is impossible。
Impossible。
And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once
neither in motion nor at rest？
There cannot。
But neither can it change without changing。
True。
When then does it change； for it cannot change either when at
rest； or when in motion； or when in time？
It cannot。
And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing
really exist？
What thing？
The moment。 For the moment seems to imply a something out of which
change takes place into either of two states； for the change is not
from the state of rest as such； nor； from the state of motion as such；
but there is this curious nature； which we call the moment lying
between rest and motion； not being in any time； and into this and
out of this what is in motion changes into rest； and what is at rest
into motion。
So it appears。
And the one then； since it is at rest and also in motion； will
change to either； for only in this way can it be in both。 And in
changing it changes in a moment； and when it is changing it will be in
no time； and will not then be either in motion or at rest。
It will not。
And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes；
when it passes from being into cessation of being； or from not…being
into becoming…then it passes between certain states of motion and
rest； and； neither is nor is not； nor becomes nor is destroyed。
Very true。
And on the same principle； in the passage from one to many and
from many to one； the one is neither one nor many； neither separated
nor aggregated； and in the passage from like to unlike； and from
unlike to like； it is neither like nor unlike； neither in a state of
assimilation nor of dissimilation； and in the passage from small to
great and equal and back again； it will be neither small nor great；
nor equal； nor in a state of increase； or diminution； or equalization。
True。
All these； then； are the affections of the one； if the one has
being。
Of course。
But if one is； what will happen to the others …is not that also to
be considered？
Yes。
Let us show then； if one is； what will be the affections of the
others than the one。
Let us do so。
Inasmuch as there are things other than the one； the others are
not the one； for if they were they could not be other than the one。
Very true。
Very true。
Nor are the others altogether without the one； but in a certain
way they participate in the one。
In what way？
Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have
parts； for if they had no parts they would be simply one。
Right。
And parts； as we affirm； have relation to a whole？
So we say。
And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many； and the parts
will be parts of the one； for each of the parts is not a part of many；
but of a whole。
How do you mean？
If anything were a part of many； being itself one of them； it will
surely be a part of itself； which is impossible； and it will be a part
of each one of the other parts； if of all； for if not a part of some
one； it will be a part of all the others but this one； and thus will
not be a part of each one； and if not a part of each； one it will
not be a part of anyone of the many； and not being a part of any
one； it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of
none of which it is anything。
Clearly not。
Then the part is not a part of the many； nor of all； but is of a
certain single form； which we call a whole； being one perfect unity
framed out of all…of this the part will be a part。
Certainly。
If； then； the others have parts； they will participate in the
whole and in the one。
True。
Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole； having
parts。
Certainly。
And the same argument holds of each part； for the part must
participate in the one； for if each of the parts is a part； this
means； I suppose； that it is one separate from the rest and
self…related； otherwise it is not each。
True。
But when we speak of the part participating in the one； it must
clearly be other than one； for if not； it would merely have
participated； but would have been one； whereas only the itself can
be one。
Very true。
Both the whole and the part must participate in the one； for the
whole will be one whole； of which the parts will be parts； and each
part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part。
True。
And will not the things which participate in the one； be other
than it？
Of course。
And the things which are other than the one will be many； for if the
things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than
one； they would be nothing。
True。
But； seeing that the things which participate in the one as a
part； and in the one as a whole； are more than one； must not those
very things which participate in the one be infinite in number？
How so？
Let us look at the matter thus：…Is it not a fact that in partaking
of the one they are not one； and do not partake of the one at the very
time。 when they are partaking of it？
Clearly。
They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present？
Very true。
And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest
fraction； must not that least fraction； if it does not partake of
the one； be a multitude and not one？
It must。
And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature；
regarded simply； and in itself； will not they； as far as we see
them； be unlimited in number？
Certainly。
And yet； when each several part becomes a part； then the parts
have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other； and the whole
in relation to the parts。
Just so。
The result to the others than the one is that of themselves and
the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them
limitation in relation to one another； whereas in their own nature
they have no limit。
That is clear。
Then the others than the one； both as whole and parts； are infinite；
and also partake of limit。
Certainly。
Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves
