parmenides-第9章
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and also partake of limit。
Certainly。
Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves。
How is that？
Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature； they are all
affected in the same way。
True。
And inasmuch as they all partake of limit； they are all affected
in the same way。
Of course。
But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited； they
are affected in opposite ways。
Yes。
And opposites are the most unlike of things。
Certainly。
Considered； then； in regard to either one of their affections；
they will be like themselves and one another； considered in
reference to both of them together； most opposed and most unlike。
That appears to be true。
Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another？
True。
And they are the same and also different from one another； and in
motion and at rest； and experience every sort of opposite affection；
as may be proved without difficulty of them； since they have been
shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid？
True。
Suppose； now； that we leave the further discussion of these
matters as evident； and consider again upon the hypothesis that the
one is； whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of
the others。
By all means。
Then let us begin again； and ask； If one is； what must be the
affections of the others？
Let us ask that question。
Must not the one be distinct from the others； and the others from
the one？
Why so？
Why； because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct
from both of them； for the expression 〃one and the others〃 includes
all things。
Yes； all things。
Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in
which both the one and the others might exist？
There is nothing。
Then the one and the others are never in the same？
True。
Then they are separated from each other？
Yes。
And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts？
Impossible。
Then the one will not be in the others as a whole； nor as part； if
it be separated from the others； and has no parts？
Impossible。
Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one；
if they do not partake either in whole or in part？
It would seem not。
Then there is no way in which the others are one； or have in
themselves any unity？
There is not。
Nor are the others many； for if they were many； each part of them
would be a part of the whole； but now the others； not partaking in any
way of the one； are neither one nor many； nor whole； nor part。
True。
Then the others neither are nor contain two or three； if entirely
deprived of the one？
True。
Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one； nor is likeness
and unlikeness in them； for if they were like and unlike； or had in
them likeness and unlikeness； they would have two natures in them
opposite to one another。
That is clear。
But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things
was held by us to be impossible？
Impossible。
Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both； for if they
were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures；
which would be one thing； and if they were both they would partake
of opposites which would be two things； and this has been shown to
be impossible。
True。
Therefore they are neither the same； nor other； nor in motion； nor
at rest； nor in a state of becoming； nor of being destroyed； nor
greater； nor less； nor equal； nor have they experienced anything
else of the sort； for； if they are capable of experiencing any such
affection； they will participate in one and two and three； and odd and
even； and in these； as has been proved； they do not participate；
seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one。
Very true。
Therefore if one is； the one is all things； and also nothing； both
in relation to itself and to other things。
Certainly。
Well； and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence
if the one is not？
Yes； we ought。
What is the meaning of the hypothesis…If the one is not； is there
any difference between this and the hypothesis…If the not one is not？
There is a difference； certainly。
Is there a difference only； or rather are not the two expressions…if
the one is not； and if the not one is not； entirely opposed？
They are entirely opposed。
And suppose a person to say：…If greatness is not； if smallness is
not； or anything of that sort； does he not mean； whenever he uses such
an expression； that 〃what is not〃 is other than other things？
To be sure。
And so when he says 〃If one is not〃 he clearly means； that what
〃is not〃 is other than all others； we know what he means…do we not？
Yes； we do。
When he says 〃one；〃 he says something which is known； and secondly
something which is other than all other things； it makes no difference
whether he predicate of one being or not being； for that which is said
〃not to be〃 is known to be something all the same； and is
distinguished from other things。
Certainly。
Then I will begin again； and ask： If one is not； what are the
consequences？ In the first place； as would appear； there is a
knowledge of it； or the very meaning of the words； 〃if one is not；〃
would not be known。
True。
Secondly； the others differ from it； or it could not be described as
different from the others？
Certainly。
Difference； then； belongs to it as well as knowledge； for in
speaking of the one as different from the others； we do not speak of a
difference in the others； but in the one。
Clearly so。
Moreover； the one that is not is something and partakes of
relation to 〃that；〃 and 〃this；〃 and 〃these；〃 and the like； and is an
attribute of 〃this〃； for the one； or the others than the one； could
not have been spoken of； nor could any attribute or relative of the
one that is not have been or been spoken of； nor could it have been
said to be anything； if it did not partake of 〃some；〃 or of the
other relations just now mentioned。
True。
Being； then； cannot be ascribed to the one； since it is not； but the
one that is not may or rather must participate in many things； if it
and nothing else is not； if； however； neither the one nor the one that
is not is supposed not to be； and we are speaking of something of a
different nature； we can predicate nothing of it。 But supposing that
the one that is not and nothing else is not； then it must
participate in the predicate 〃that；〃 and in many others。
Certainly。
And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others； for the
others being different from the one will be of a different kind。
Certainly。
And are not things of a different kind also other in kind？
Of course。
And are not things other in kind unlike？
They are unlike。
And if they are unlike the one； that which they are unlike will
clearly be unlike them？
Clearly so。
Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are
unlike it？
That would seem to be true。
And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it； it must
have likeness to itself。
How so？
If the one have unlikeness to one； something else must be meant； nor
will the hypothesis relate to one； but it will relate to something
other than one？
Quite so。
But that cannot be。
No。
Then the one must have likeness to itself？
It must。
Again； it is not equal to the others； for if it were equal； then
it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality； but if
one has no being； then it can neither be nor be like？
It cannot。
But since it is not equal to the others； neither can the others be
equal to it？
Certainly not。
And things that are not equal are unequal？
True。
And they are unequal to an unequal？
Of course。
Then the one partakes of inequality； and in respect of this the
others are unequal to it？
Very true。
And inequality implies greatness and smallness？
Yes。
Then the one； if of such a nature； has greatness and smallness？
That appears to be true。
And greatness and smallness always stand apart？
True。
Then there is always something between them？
There is。
And can you think of anything else which is between them other
than equality？
No； it is equality which lies between them。
Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality； which
lies between them？
That is clear。
Then the one； which is not； partakes； as would appear； of
greatness and smallness and equality？
Clearly。
Further； it must surely in a sort partake of being？
How so？
It must be so； for if not； then we should not speak the truth in
saying that the one is not。 But if we speak the truth； clearly we must
say what is。 Am I not right？
Yes。
And since we affirm that we speak truly； we must also affirm that we
say what is？
Certainly。
Then； as would appear； the one； when it is not； is； for if it were
not to be when it is not； but were to relinquish something of being；
so as to become not…being； it would at once be。
Quite true。
Then the one which is not； if it is to maintain itself； must have
the being of not…being as the bond of not…being； just as being must
have as a bond the not…being of not…being in order to perfect its
own being； for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the
not…being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being；
and not of the being of not…being…that is； the perfection of being；
and when not…being does not partake of the not…being of not…being
but of the being of not…being…that is the perfection of not…being。
Most true。
Since then what is partakes of not…being； and what is not of
being； must not the one also partake of being in order not to be？
Certainly。
Then the one； if it is not； clearly has being？
Clearly。
And has not…being also； if it is not？
Of course。
But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state
without changing？
Impossible。
Then everything which is and is not in a certain state； implies
change？
Certainly。
And change is motion…we may say that？
Yes； motion。
And the one has been proved both to be and not to be？
Yes。
And therefore is and is not in the same state？
Yes。
Thus the one that is not
