wealbk04-第18章

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would　otherwise　lose　upon　the　price　of　his　goods；　his　own

interest　would　soon　oblige　him　to　employ　his　stock　in　another

way；　or　to　find　out　a　trade　in　which　the　price　of　the　goods　would

replace　to　him；　with　the　ordinary　profit；　the　capital　employment

in　sending　them　to　market。　The　effect　of　bounties；　like　that　of

all　the　other　expedients　of　the　mercantile　system；　can　only　be　to

force　the　trade　of　a　country　into　a　channel　much　less

advantageous　than　that　in　which　it　would　naturally　run　of　its　own

accord。

　　　　　The　ingenious　and　well…informed　author　of　the　tracts　upon

the　corn　trade　has　shown　very　clearly　that；　since　the　bounty　upon

the　exportation　of　corn　was　first　established；　the　price　of　the

corn　exported；　valued　moderately　enough；　has　exceeded　that　of　the

corn　imported；　valued　very　high；　by　a　much　greater　sum　than　the

amount　of　the　whole　bounties　which　have　been　paid　during　that

period。　This；　he　imagines；　upon　the　true　principles　of　the

mercantile　system；　is　a　clear　proof　that　this　forced　corn　trade

is　beneficial　to　the　nation；　the　value　of　the　exportation

exceeding　that　of　the　importation　by　a　much　greater　sum　than　the

whole　extraordinary　expense　which　the　public　has　been　at　in　order

to　get　it　exported。　He　does　not　consider　that　this　extraordinary

expense；　or　the　bounty；　is　the　smallest　part　of　the　expense　which

the　exportation　of　corn　really　costs　the　society。　The　capital

which　the　farmer　employed　in　raising　it　must　likewise　be　taken

into　the　account。　Unless　the　price　of　the　corn　when　sold　in　the

foreign　markets　replaces；　not　only　the　bounty；　but　this　capital；

together　with　the　ordinary　profits　of　stock；　the　society　is　a

loser　by　the　difference；　or　the　national　stock　is　so　much

diminished。　But　the　very　reason　for　which　it　has　been　thought

necessary　to　grant　a　bounty　is　the　supposed　insufficiency　of　the

price　to　do　this。

　　　　　The　average　price　of　corn；　it　has　been　said；　has　fallen

considerably　since　the　establishment　of　the　bounty。　That　the

average　price　of　corn　began　to　fall　somewhat　towards　the　end　of

the　last　century；　and　has　continued　to　do　so　during　the　course　of

the　sixty…four　first　years　of　the　present；　I　have　already

endeavoured　to　show。　But　this　event；　supposing　it　to　be　as　real

as　I　believe　it　to　be；　must　have　happened　in　spite　of　the　bounty；

and　cannot　possibly　have　happened　in　consequence　of　it。　It　has

happened　in　France；　as　well　as　in　England；　though　in　France　there

was　not　only　no　bounty；　but；　till　1764；　the　exportation　of　corn

was　subjected　to　a　general　prohibition。　This　gradual　fall　in　the

average　price　of　grain；　it　is　probable；　therefore；　is　ultimately

owing　neither　to　the　one　regulation　nor　to　the　other。　but　to　that

gradual　and　insensible　rise　in　the　real　value　of　silver；　which；

in　the　first　book　in　this　discourse；　I　have　endeavoured　to　show

has　taken　place　in　the　general　market　of　Europe　during　the　course

of　the　present　century。　It　seems　to　be　altogether　impossible　that

the　bounty　could　ever　contribute　to　lower　the　price　of　grain。

　　　　　In　years　of　plenty；　it　has　already　been　observed；　the

bounty；　by　occasioning　an　extraordinary　exportation；　necessarily

keeps　up　the　price　of　corn　in　the　home　market　above　what　it　would

naturally　fall　to。　To　do　so　was　the　avowed　purpose　of　the

institution。　In　years　of　scarcity；　though　the　bounty　is

frequently　suspended；　yet　the　great　exportation　which　it

occasions　in　years　of　plenty　must　frequently　hinder　more　or　less

the　plenty　of　one　year　from　relieving　the　scarcity　of　another。

Both　in　years　of　plenty　and　in　years　of　scarcity；　therefore；　the

bounty　necessarily　tends　to　raise　the　money　price　of　corn

somewhat　higher　than　it　otherwise　would　be　in　the　home　market。

　　　　　That；　in　the　actual　state　of　tillage；　the　bounty　must

necessarily　have　this　tendency　will　not；　I　apprehend；　be　disputed

by　any　reasonable　person。　But　it　has　been　thought　by　many　people

that　it　tends　to　encourage　tillage；　and　that　in　two　different

ways；　first；　by　opening　a　more　extensive　foreign　market　to　the

corn　of　the　farmer；　it　tends；　they　imagine；　to　increase　the

demand　for；　and　consequently　the　production　of　that　commodity；

and　secondly；　by　securing　to　him　a　better　price　than　he　could

otherwise　expect　in　the　actual　state　of　tillage；　it　tends；　they

suppose；　to　encourage　tillage。　This　double　encouragement　must；

they　imagine；　in　a　long　period　of　years；　occasion　such　an

increase　in　the　production　of　corn　as　may　lower　its　price　in　the

home　market　much　more　than　the　bounty　can　raise　it；　in　the　actual

state　which　tillage　may；　at　the　end　of　that　period；　happen　to　be

in。

　　　　　I　answer；　that　whatever　extension　of　the　foreign　market　can

be　occasioned　by　the　bounty　must；　in　every　particular　year；　be

altogether　at　the　expense　of　the　home　market；　as　every　bushel　of

corn　which　is　exported　by　means　of　the　bounty；　and　which　would

not　have　been　exported　without　the　bounty；　would　have　remained　in

the　home　market　to　increase　the　consumption　and　to　lower　the

price　of　that　commodity。　The　corn　bounty；　it　is　to　be　observed；

as　well　as　every　other　bounty　upon　exportation；　imposes　two

different　taxes　upon　the　people；　first；　the　tax　which　they　are

obliged　to　contribute　in　order　to　pay　the　bounty；　and　secondly；

the　tax　which　arises　from　the　advanced　price　of　the　commodity　in

the　home　market；　and　which；　as　the　whole　body　of　the　people　are

purchasers　of　corn；　must；　in　this　particular　commodity；　be　paid

by　the　whole　body　of　the　people。　In　this　particular　commodity；

therefore；　this　second　tax　is　by　much　the　heavier　of　the　two。　Let

us　suppose　that；　taking　one　year　with　another；　the　bounty　of　five

shillings　upon　the　exportation　of　the　quarter　of　wheat　raises　the

price　of　that　commodity　in　the　home　market　only　sixpence　the

bushel；　or　four　shillings　the　quarter；　higher　than　it　otherwise

would　have　been　in　the　actual　state　of　the　crop。　Even　upon　this

very　moderate　supposition；　the　great　body　of　the　people；　over　and

above　contributing　the　tax　which　pays　the　bounty　of　five

shillings　upon　every　quarter　of　wheat　exported；　must　pay　another

of　four　shillings　upon　every　quarter　which　they　themselves

consume。　But；　according　to　the　very　well　informed　author　of　the

tracts　upon　the　corn　trade；　the　average　proportion　of　the　corn

exported　to　that　consumed　at　home　is　not　more　than　that　of　one　to

thirty…one。　For　every　five　shillings；　therefore；　which　they

contribute　to　the　payment　of　the　first　tax；　they　must　contribute

six　pounds　four　shillings　to　the　payment　of　the　second。　So　very

heavy　a　tax　upon　the　first　necessary　of　life　must　either　reduce

the　subsistence　of　the　labouring　poor；　or　it　must　occasion　some

augmentation　in　their　pecuniary　wages　proportionable　to　that　in

the　pecuniary　price　of　their　subsistence。　So　far　as　it　operates

in　the　one　way；　it　must　reduce　the　ability　of　the　labouring　poor

to　educate　and　bring　up　their　children；　and　must；　so　far；　tend　to

restrain　the　population　of　the　country。　So　far　as　it　operates　in

the　other；　it　must　reduce　the　ability　of　the　employers　of　the

poor　to　employ　so　great　a　number　as　they　otherwise　might　do；　and

must；　so　far；　tend　to　restrain　the　industry　of　the　country。　The

extraordinary　exportation　of　corn；　therefore；　occasioned　by　the

bounty；　not　only；　in　every　particular　year；　diminishes　the　home；

just　as　much　as　it　extends　the　foreign；　market　and　consumption；

but；　by　restraining　the　population　and　industry　of　the　country；

its　final　tendency　is　to　stunt　and　restrain　the　gradual　extension

of　the　home　market；　and　thereby；　in　the　long　run；　rather　to

diminish；　than　to　augment；　the　whole　market　and　consumption　of

corn。

　　　　　This　enhancement　of　the　money　price　of　corn；　however；　it　has

been　thought；　by　rendering　that　commodity　more　profitable　to　the

farmer；　must　necessarily　encourage　its　production。

　　　　　I　answer；　that　this　might　be　the　case　if　the　effect　of　the

bounty　was　to　raise　the　real　price　of　corn；　or　to　enable　the

farmer；　with　an　equal　quantity　of　it；　to　maintain　a　greater

number　of　labourers　in　the　same　manner；　whether　liberal；

moderate；　or　scanty；　that　other　labourers　are　commonly　maintained

in　his　neighbourhood。　But　neither　the　bounty；　it　is　evident；　nor

any　other　human　institution　can　have　any　such　effect。　It　is　not

the　real；　but　the　nominal　price　of　corn；　which　can　in　any

considerable　degree　be　affected　by　the　bounty。　And　though　the　tax

which　that　institution　imposes　upon　the　whole　body　of　the　people

may　be　very　burdensome　to　those　who　pay　it；　it　is　of　very　little

advantage　to　those　who　receive　it。

　　　　　The　real　effect　of　the　bounty　is　not　so　much　to　raise　the

real　value　of　corn　as　to　degrade　the　real　value　of　silver；　or　to

make　an　equal　quantity　of　it　exchange　for　a　smaller　quantity；　not

only　of　corn；　but　of　all　other　homemade　commodities：　for　the

money　price　of　corn　regulates　that　of　all　other　home…made

commodities。

　　　　　It　regulates　the　money　price　of　labour；　which　must　always　be

such　as　to　enable　the　labourer　to　purchase　a　quantity　of　corn

sufficient　to　maintain　him　and　his　family　either　in　the　liberal；

moderate；　or　scanty　manner　in　which　the　advancing；　stationary；　or

declining　circumstances　of　the　society　oblige　his　employers　to

maintain　him。

　　　　　It　regulates　the　money　price　of　all　the　other　parts　of　the

rude　produce　of　land；　which；　in　every　period　of　improvement；　must

bear　a　certain　proportion　to　that　of　corn；　though　this　proportion

is　different　in　different　periods。　It　regulates；　for　example；　the

money　price　of　grass　and　hay；　of　butcher's　meat；　of　horses；　and

the　maintenance　of　horses；　of　land　carriage　consequently；　or　of

the　greater　part　of　the　inland　commerce　of　the　country。

　　　　　By　regulating　the　money　price　of　all　the　other　parts　of　the

rude　produce　of　land；　it　regulates　that　of　the　materials　of

almost　all　manufactures。　By　regulating　the　money　price　of　labour；

it　regulates　that　of　manufacturing　art　and　industry。　And　by

regulating　both；　it　regulates　that　of　the　complete　manufacture。

The　money　price　of　labour；　and　of　everything　that　is　the　produce

either　of　land　or　labour；　must　necessarily　either　rise　or　fall　in

proportion　to　the　money　price　of　corn。

　　　　　Though　in　consequence　of　the　bounty；　therefore；　the　farmer

should　be　enabled　to　sell　his　corn　for　four　shillings　a　bushel

instead　of　three…and…sixpence；　and　to　pay　his　landlord　a　money

rent　proportionable　to　this　rise　in　the　money　price　of　his

produce；　yet　if；　in　consequence　of　this　rise　in　the　price　of

corn；　four　shillings　will　purchase　no　more　homemade　goods　of　any

other　kind　than　three…and…sixpence　would　have　done　before；

neither　the　circumstances　of　the　farmer　nor　those　of　the　landlord

will　be　much　mended　by　this　change。　The　farmer　will　not　be　able

to　cultivate　much　better：　the　landlord　will　not　be　able　to　live

much　better。　In　the　purchase　of　foreign　commodities　this

enhancement　in　the　price　of　corn　may　give　them　some　little

advantage。　In　that　of　home…made　commodities　it　can　give　them　none

at　all。　And　almost　the　whole　expense　of　the　farmer；　and　the　far

greater　part　even　of　that　of　the　landlord；　is　in　homemade

com