wealbk04-第43章

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mortifying　to　the　pride　of　every　nation；　and　what　is　perhaps　of

still　greater　consequence；　they　are　always　contrary　to　the

private　interest　of　the　governing　part　of　it；　who　would　thereby

be　deprived　of　the　disposal　of　many　places　of　trust　and　profit；

of　many　opportunities　of　acquiring　wealth　and　distinction；　which

the　possession　of　the　most　turbulent；　and；　to　the　great　body　of

the　people；　the　most　unprofitable　province　seldom　fails　to

afford。　The　most　visionary　enthusiast　would　scarce　be　capable　of

proposing　such　a　measure　with　any　serious　hopes　at　least　of　its

ever　being　adopted。　If　it　was　adopted；　however；　Great　Britain

would　not　only　be　immediately　freed　from　the　whole　annual　expense

of　the　peace　establishment　of　the　colonies；　but　might　settle　with

them　such　a　treaty　of　commerce　as　would　effectually　secure　to　her

a　free　trade；　more　advantageous　to　the　great　body　of　the　people；

though　less　so　to　the　merchants；　than　the　monopoly　which　she　at

present　enjoys。　By　thus　parting　good　friends；　the　natural

affection　of　the　colonies　to　the　mother　country　which；　perhaps；

our　late　dissensions　have　well　nigh　extinguished；　would　quickly

revive。　It　might　dispose　them　not　only　to　respect；　for　whole

centuries　together；　that　treaty　of　commerce　which　they　had

concluded　with　us　at　parting；　but　to　favour　us　in　war　as　well　as

in　trade；　and；　instead　of　turbulent　and　factious　subjects；　to

become　our　most　faithful；　affectionate；　and　generous　allies；　and

the　same　sort　of　parental　affection　on　the　one　side；　and　filial

respect　on　the　other；　might　revive　between　Great　Britain　and　her

colonies；　which　used　to　subsist　between　those　of　ancient　Greece

and　the　mother　city　from　which　they　descended。

　　　　　In　order　to　render　any　province　advantageous　to　the　empire

to　which　it　belongs；　it　ought　to　afford；　in　time　of　peace；　a

revenue　to　the　public　sufficient　not　only　for　defraying　the　whole

expense　of　its　own　peace　establishment；　but　for　contributing　its

proportion　to　the　support　of　the　general　government　of　the

empire。　Every　province　necessarily　contributes；　more　or　less；　to

increase　the　expense　of　that　general　government。　If　any

particular　province；　therefore；　does　not　contribute　its　share

towards　defraying　this　expense；　an　unequal　burden　must　be　thrown

upon　some　other　part　of　the　empire。　The　extraordinary　revenue；

too；　which　every　province　affords　to　the　public　in　time　of　war；

ought；　from　parity　of　reason；　to　bear　the　same　proportion　to　the

extraordinary　revenue　of　the　whole　empire　which　its　ordinary

revenue　does　in　time　of　peace。　That　neither　the　ordinary　nor

extraordinary　revenue　which　Great　Britain　derives　from　her

colonies；　bears　this　proportion　to　the　whole　revenue　of　the

British　empire；　will　readily　be　allowed。　The　monopoly；　it　has

been　supposed；　indeed；　by　increasing　the　private　revenue　of　the

people　of　Great　Britain；　and　thereby　enabling　them　to　pay　greater

taxes；　compensates　the　deficiency　of　the　public　revenue　of　the

colonies。　But　this　monopoly；　I　have　endeavoured　to　show；　though　a

very　grievous　tax　upon　the　colonies；　and　though　it　may　increase

the　revenue　of　a　particular　order　of　men　in　Great　Britain；

diminishes　instead　of　increasing　that　of　the　great　body　of　the

people；　and　consequently　diminishes　instead　of　increasing　the

ability　of　the　great　body　of　the　people　to　pay　taxes。　The　men；

too；　whose　revenue　the　monopoly　increases；　constitute　a

particular　order；　which　it　is　both　absolutely　impossible　to　tax

beyond　the　proportion　of　other　orders；　and　extremely　impolitic

even　to　attempt　to　tax　beyond　that　proportion；　as　I　shall

endeavour　to　show　in　the　following　book。　No　particular　resource；

therefore；　can　be　drawn　from　this　particular　order。

　　　　　The　colonies　may　be　taxed　either　by　their　own　assemblies；　or

by　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain。

　　　　　That　the　colony　assemblies　can　ever　be　so　managed　as　to　levy

upon　their　constituents　a　public　revenue　sufficient　not　only　to

maintain　at　all　times　their　own　civil　and　military　establishment；

but　to　pay　their　proper　proportion　of　the　expense　of　the　general

government　of　the　British　empire　seems　not　very　probable。　It　was

a　long　time　before　even　the　Parliament　of　England；　though　placed

immediately　under　the　eye　of　the　sovereign；　could　be　brought

under　such　a　system　of　management；　or　could　be　rendered

sufficiently　liberal　in　their　grants　for　supporting　the　civil　and

military　establishments　even　of　their　own　country。　It　was　only　by

distributing　among　the　particular　Members　of　Parliament　a　great

part　either　of　the　offices；　or　of　the　disposal　of　the　offices

arising　from　this　civil　and　military　establishment；　that　such　a

system　of　management　could　be　established　even　with　regard　to　the

Parliament　of　England。　But　the　distance　of　the　colony　assemblies

from　the　eye　of　the　sovereign；　their　number；　their　dispersed

situation；　and　their　various　constitutions；　would　render　it　very

difficult　to　manage　them　in　the　same　manner；　even　though　the

sovereign　had　the　same　means　of　doing　it；　and　those　means　are

wanting。　It　would　be　absolutely　impossible　to　distribute　among

all　the　leading　members　of　all　the　colony　assemblies　such　a

share；　either　of　the　offices　or　of　the　disposal　of　the　offices

arising　from　the　general　government　of　the　British　empire；　as　to

dispose　them　to　give　up　their　popularity　at　home；　and　to　tax

their　constituents　for　the　support　of　that　general　government；　of

which　almost　the　whole　emoluments　were　to　be　divided　among　people

who　were　strangers　to　them。　The　unavoidable　ignorance　of

administration；　besides；　concerning　the　relative　importance　of

the　different　members　of　those　different　assemblies；　the　offences

which　must　frequently　be　given；　the　blunders　which　must

constantly　be　committed　in　attempting　to　manage　them　in　this

manner；　seems　to　render　such　a　system　of　management　altogether

impracticable　with　regard　to　them。

　　　　　The　colony　assemblies；　besides；　cannot　be　supposed　the

proper　judges　of　what　is　necessary　for　the　defence　and　support　of

the　whole　empire。　The　care　of　that　defence　and　support　is　not

entrusted　to　them。　It　is　not　their　business；　and　they　have　no

regular　means　of　information　concerning　it。　The　assembly　of　a

province；　like　the　vestry　of　a　parish；　may　judge　very　properly

concerning　the　affairs　of　its　own　particular　district；　but　can

have　no　proper　means　of　judging　concerning　those　of　the　whole

empire。　It　cannot　even　judge　properly　concerning　the　proportion

which　its　own　province　bears　to　the　whole　empire；　or　concerning

the　relative　degree　of　its　wealth　and　importance　compared　with

the　other　provinces；　because　those　other　provinces　are　not　under

the　inspection　and　superintendency　of　the　assembly　of　a

particular　province。　What　is　necessary　for　the　defence　and

support　of　the　whole　empire；　and　in　what　proportion　each　part

ought　to　contribute；　can　be　judged　of　only　by　that　assembly　which

inspects　and　superintends　the　affairs　of　the　whole　empire。

　　　　　It　has　been　proposed；　accordingly；　that　the　colonies　should

be　taxed　by　requisition；　the　Parliament　of　Great　Britain

determining　the　sum　which　each　colony　ought　to　pay；　and　the

provincial　assembly　assessing　and　levying　it　in　the　way　that

suited　best　the　circumstances　of　the　province。　What　concerned　the

whole　empire　would　in　this　way　be　determined　by　the　assembly

which　inspects　and　superintends　the　affairs　of　the　whole　empire；

and　the　provincial　affairs　of　each　colony　might　still　be

regulated　by　its　own　assembly。　Though　the　colonies　should　in　this

case　have　no　representatives　in　the　British　Parliament；　yet；　if

we　may　judge　by　experience；　there　is　no　probability　that　the

Parliamentary　requisition　would　be　unreasonable。　The　Parliament

of　England　has　not　upon　any　occasion　shown　the　smallest

disposition　to　overburden　those　parts　of　the　empire　which　are　not

represented　in　Parliament。　The　islands　of　Guernsey　and　Jersey；

without　any　means　of　resisting　the　authority　of　Parliament；　are

more　lightly　taxed　than　any　part　of　Great　Britain。　Parliament　in

attempting　to　exercise　its　supposed　right；　whether　well　or　ill

grounded；　of　taxing　the　colonies；　has　never　hitherto　demanded　of

them　anything　which　even　approached　to　a　just　proportion　to　what

was　paid　by　their　fellow　subjects　at　home。　If　the　contribution　of

the　colonies；　besides；　was　to　rise　or　fall　in　proportion　to　the

rise　or　fall　of　the　land　tax；　Parliament　could　not　tax　them

without　taxing　at　the　same　time　its　own　constituents；　and　the

colonies　might　in　this　case　be　considered　as　virtually

represented　in　Parliament。

　　　　　Examples　are　not　wanting　of　empires　in　which　all　the

different　provinces　are　not　taxed；　if　I　may　be　allowed　the

expression；　in　one　mass；　but　in　which　the　sovereign　regulates　the

sum　which　each　province　ought　to　pay；　and　in　some　provinces

assesses　and　levies　it　as　he　thinks　proper；　while　in　others；　he

leaves　it　to　be　assessed　and　levied　as　the　respective　states　of

each　province　shall　determine。　In　some　provinces　of　France；　the

king　not　only　imposes　what　taxes　he　thinks　proper；　but　assesses

and　levies　them　in　the　way　he　thinks　proper。　From　others　he

demands　a　certain　sum；　but　leaves　it　to　the　states　of　each

province　to　assess　and　levy　that　sum　as　they　think　proper。

According　to　the　scheme　of　taxing　by　requisition；　the　Parliament

of　Great　Britain　would　stand　nearly　in　the　same　situation　towards

the　colony　assemblies　as　the　King　of　France　does　towards　the

states　of　those　provinces　which　still　enjoy　the　privilege　of

having　states　of　their　own；　the　provinces　of　France　which　are

supposed　to　be　the　best　governed。

　　　　　But　though；　according　to　this　scheme；　the　colonies　could

have　no　just　reason　to　fear　that　their　share　of　the　public

burdens　should　ever　exceed　the　proper　proportion　to　that　of　their

fellow…citizens　at　home；　Great　Britain　might　have　just　reason　to

fear　that　it　never　would　amount　to　that　proper　proportion。　The

Parliament　of　Great　Britain　has　not　for　some　time　past　had　the

same　established　authority　in　the　colonies；　which　the　French　king

has　in　those　provinces　of　France　which　still　enjoy　the　privilege

of　having　states　of　their　own。　The　colony　assemblies；　if　they

were　not　very　favourably　disposed　（and　unless　more　skilfully

managed　than　they　ever　have　been　hitherto；　they　are　not　very

likely　to　be　so）　might　still　find　many　pretences　for　evading　or

rejecting　the　most　reasonable　requisitions　of　Parliament。　A

French　war　breaks　out；　we　shall　suppose；　ten　millions　must

immediately　be　raised　in　order　to　defend　the　seat　of　the　empire。

This　sum　must　be　borrowed　upon　the　credit　of　some　Parliamentary

fund　mortgaged　for　paying　the　interest。　Part　of　this　fund

Parliament　proposes　to　raise　by　a　tax　to　be　levied　in　Great

Britain；　and　part　of　it　by　a　requisition　to　all　the　different

colony　assemblies　of　America　and　the　West　Indies。　Would　people

readily　advance　their　money　upon　the　credit　of　a　fund；　which

partly　depended　upon　the　good　humour　of　all　those　assemblies；　far

distant　from　the　seat　of　the　war；　and　sometimes；　perhaps；

thinking　themselves　not　much　concerned　in　the　event　of　it？　Upon

s